Thursday, December 11, 2003

sniffing Howard Dean

With thanks to Edwin Thomas for, as always, enormous food for thought.

ET took a gander at Dean for America, Howard Dean's official site, and reviewed Dean's platform on North Korea, where Dean declares:

A nuclear North Korea is unacceptable. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration's mishandling of this crisis has made this outcome more, not less, likely. Contrary to this Administration's view, engagement is not appeasement, and it is time for a coherent approach that will effectively deal with this crisis:

  • Negotiate a resolution of this issue with North Korea—but do so from strength. We are the strongest nation in the world; North Korea is one of the most backward and isolated.


  • Articulate a redline, making clear that the US—and it allies especially Japan and South Korea—will not tolerate NK's production of nuclear weapons.


  • Offer a declaration of peaceful intentions and economic exchanges—supported by our allies especially South Korea and Japan—in exchange for verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons.


  • Utilize a program of intrusive inspections to generate verifiability of any agreement.


  • Develop an economic program with South Korea, Japan, and China that will generate change in the North Korean society.


  • Edwin's comments:

    There needs to be a clearly established set of rules for how far we
    are willing to go to ensure that North Korea has no nuclear capability,
    including when and if to commit US troops and precipitate armed conflict. This
    is implied but not addressed specifically. Nor could it be, in a public
    statement.

    Under Dean's plan, what, exactly, do we do when Corea del Norte tells us where
    to shove our 'intrusive inspections'? It is a given that under no circumstances
    will outsiders be given free access to anywhere in the North.

    There is no economic plan, in my opinion, that will induce change in North
    Korean politics or culture. We are not dealing with a communist oligarchy, as
    in China, which may be swayed by such concerns. We are instead dealing with an
    absolute monarchy predicated on the belief that the Glorious Leader is a
    supernatural being, while said cult-like society wears the outward trappings of
    communism.

    Also, I am concerned that he does not specifically state that a non-aggression
    pact is out of the question while a state of war still technically exists, as
    some of his rhetoric seems... conciliatory.

    As I stated before- North Korea needs to be delicately and deliberately brought
    to its knees not via conciliation, but by aggressive isolation and economic
    destruction. Yes - this will kill thousands of innocents and spare the core
    military and the ruler (at least in the short run) but all of these people
    affected will not be the US and its allies. We should also make it clear that
    infringement into South Korean or American territories will result in the
    destruction of the North. This kind of force-based threat is consistent with
    the North's apparent understanding of negotiation. The time for appeasement is
    at an end and any further action along that road only buys the North more time
    to develop full nukes and thereby strengthen their position.


    This was my reply to Edwin:

    I think you're right-- your comments are spot-on, esp. re: verification. So here's the thing: I think both Dems and Reps are on board about verification being the most important element in any agreement. The question then becomes one of willingness to (1) push verification as an issue in negotiation, (2) actually go about verifying as thoroughly as we can, assuming we actually squeeze out such a monstrous concession from NK (which I doubt).

    And I think you've ferreted Dean out with this remark:

    "Also, I am concerned that he does not specifically state that a non-aggression pact is out of the question while a state of war still technically exists, as some of his rhetoric seems.. conciliatory."

    This is precisely why the Republicans are so happy to see Dean leading the polls. He's going to get pounded on defense/nat'l security issues, and right or wrong, his antiwar past (he's been admirably honest re: military service, I think, compared to Certain Others, including the sitting prez, who hasn't been all that forthcoming about the nature of his own "service" to his country) is going to be brought into the debate. This will probably prove a huge liability as Republicans connect the dots between Dean's past and his probable foreign policy.

    I suspect Dean would pull a Clinton while in office-- a repeat of the 1994 "agreed framework," at which NK has confessed it thumbed its nose. Clinton's and Carter's legacies regarding NK amount, in my eyes, to a huge failure. Not to let Republicans off the hook on this; I'm disappointed at how internally conflicted the Bush Administration is right now, and the rift between Pentagon and State is something that needs healing-- or at least patching. But I'm not confident Dean is the man to create a breakthrough with NK.

    So really, I don't have any major insights to add to what you've already stated. I think your instincts about Dean's Korea "policy" are accurate. Dean probably shouldn't be judged on Korea policy alone; he's apparently done some good, economically speaking, as governor. That'd be a huge improvement over Bush-- a fiscally conservative president. Maybe if Dean is paired with a hawkish running mate, there'd be some kind of balance. I don't know. Dean would also have to pick a cabinet that's willing to press him about the harsh realities in Asia and Iraq. Can he? Will he? I don't know.

    As for economic collapse in NK... yes, that's the only truly humane option out of a gamut of bad alternatives. For me, right now, war is unacceptable. I'm not convinced Seoul can be saved in the event of a conflict, and unfortunately, SK put all its eggs in one basket when it based everything governmental and economic in Seoul. Too much of what makes SK run will be lost in the first 48 hours of ground combat, I think.

    So yeah... we bleed North Korea-- hard-- and pray for collapse and no ensuing war as generals (or whoever) try to fill the power vacuum. Gotta keep in mind, though, that bleeding NK is a multilateral task, and convincing SK to shed the myth of "one people" will be very, very difficult. This, unfortunately, is where Bush has shot himself in the foot: that pesky problem of diplomatic capital. South Koreans hate the man & won't listen to him. He's squandered whatever trust he might've had from the South Koreans.

    Maybe with someone like Dean in office, we can try a soft-sell to SK, convincing them to take a harsher stance against the North, but through a silkier Democratic voice... or am I just dreaming? Can Dean, the Angry Man, even pull that off (i.e., the soft sell)? Just how much of a diplomat is he?

    My responses to Dean's planks:

    "A nuclear North Korea is unacceptable. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration's mishandling of this crisis has made this outcome more, not less, likely."

    First sentence: OK. Pretty much everyone agrees. Second sentence: I disagree. I don't think Bush is "mishandling" this at all, and if Dean is implying that NK's aggressive posture was caused by Bush, he's got his head crammed firmly inside his rectum.

    "Contrary to this Administration's view, engagement is not appeasement, and it is time for a coherent approach that will effectively deal with this crisis:"

    I don't think the Bush Administration feels engagement is appeasement. If this were so, we wouldn't be trying for the next round of 6-way talks. Pure fluff, Dean. As for a "coherent approach"-- heh. The situation is pretty damn clear; the question is who has the guts to make what move. Any significant tilt in any direction spells probable war.

    Let's parse "engagement," though. Our reasoning behind the multilateral talks in Asia is that we want to diffuse responsibility. We're doing this because it's the exact opposite of the NK strategy, which is to put the onus of blame entirely on America, as if the regional powers have neither say nor responsibility. But this is risky for NK, because China's not quite the avid supporter it once was, and Japan's ready to go "fuck it" and remilitarize.

    So engagement isn't just about NK; it's about getting the whole region involved in managing the crisis, and introducing complexity into a situation that NK prefers to keep simple, like a Mexican standoff. So far, NK gets points for maintaining the Mexican standoff this long. Nothing short of incredible. But I suspect Bush's apparent stubbornness or stupidity (or whatever it is) has made NK very nervous. Nervous is good. A NK constantly poised on the balls of its feet is a NK that drains itself faster than it would otherwise.

    So "engagement" through the multilateral paradigm serves to (1) diffuse/distribute responsibility, (2) put the regional powers on notice that this problem is in their back yard, (3) increase the complexity of the game, and (4) cause NK to tire itself a bit faster. It strikes me as common sense to involve China, Russia, SK, and Japan in this. Ironically, they may show a sense of involvement that puts Western Europe to shame, when you look back at how Western Europe ignored the Yugoslav problem by largely pretending it didn't exist.

    "Negotiate a resolution of this issue with North Korea—but do so from strength. We are the strongest nation in the world; North Korea is one of the most backward and isolated."

    Yeah, fine, but what does this mean?

    Articulate a redline, making clear that the US—and it allies especially Japan and South Korea—will not tolerate NK's production of nuclear weapons

    Sigh... we've been articulating redlines. AND...?

    "Offer a declaration of peaceful intentions and economic exchanges—supported by our allies especially South Korea and Japan—in exchange for verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons."

    I'm very much against declarations of nonaggression. Maybe "peaceful intentions" aren't the same thing, but NK has dictated what it wants: nothing less than the forceful language of a TREATY. I'd be disappointed in any president, of either party, who decided to go there. That would be a sellout.

    "Utilize a program of intrusive inspections to generate verifiability of any agreement."

    Yes, definitely-- but (1) how to gain this concession, and (2) how intrusive will "intrusive" be?

    "Develop an economic program with South Korea, Japan, and China that will generate change in the North Korean society."

    I'm absolutely, wholeheartedly for this, and it's something that can be done NOW. The war of the mind-- through propaganda, crass cultural imperialism, or whatever-- is in the long run far more important than any military resolution. Because peaceful options are always preferable.


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