Hominid gets body-slammed, farts chunky reply

So the Marmot and Kevin of IA both linked to my commentary on "The Next Korean War." Unlike my blog, which I rule with an iron tentacle, Kevin's and the Marmot's blog allow people to append comments to pieces. A certain "Captain Scarlet" (man? woman? are we supposed to pick a sex?) left a comment in The Marmot's Hole voicing annoyance at my obvious ignorance of the Korean situation. I get annoyed at people who get annoyed at me, especially when they don't know me. Here's what Scarlet said in full:

china doesn't want a fight with the US. their air force is too weak and small to handle ours. this isn't the S where the US had a very weak army because of the Doolittle commission. we won't be fighting the last fight. it will be a fight on our terms.

I'm tired of everyone that only has a bit knowledge of Korean affairs ASSUMING that Seoul will be their first target for an artillery barrage. aiming your artillery (which is really your only defense against the US) at unarmed civilians while the US air force and army are pounding you will only cause the war to end quickly. i find it hard to believe the norks are that stupid.

the norks only have a handful of fighter planes.. there won't be a dog fight that last more than several hours.

bottom line, the bighom sounds very worried but his worries are brought on because of his lack of knowledge about the current military coefficients in Korea.

i personally don't believe the norks have nukes yet. i think they would have loved to test one underground just to show everyone they have them and use it as a bargaining chip.

does anyone believe that the north will allow inspections in the north that will satisfy the bush administration? if they don't, there isn't any real need to have talks and i can almost guarantee you how this will end. i believe that the nuke situation will not be solved without shots being fired.

Captain Scarlet

Obviously, Captain Scarlet must now die for implying that the Hominid is cranially challenged.

I wrote the captain a reply granting that, yes, I'm just an armchair speculator, and not a military expert. But I did accuse Scarlet of being naive re: NK not having nukes.

The upshot of Scarlet's letter (heh) is that we're gonna kick ass. I agree with that assessment. I mentioned it several times in my post: NK will lose. But Scarlet's implication seems to be that, if you're in Seoul, you shouldn't worry, and it's really annoying that you're worried, Kev, because Seoul's not the big target.

Funny... most expert analyses grant that Seoul's going to be first to go in the event of all-out war.

Anyway, I do lack knowledge of "current military coefficients" in Korea. So I decided my big ass had better do more research instead of basing my stats on a Salon.com article, or I can expect more Captain Scarlets chewing on my buttocks.

My focus, in this blog post, is to set Scarlet straight.

1. Experts-- not just bloggers-- know that thousands of artillery units are in fact pointed at Seoul, not the sky. This indicates, at the least, the intent to blast Seoul. Artillery POINTED AT SEOUL, not "facing vaguely toward."

2. Experts-- not just bloggers-- take the nuclear threat seriously and do not feel safe assuming that NK has no nukes yet.

3. Experts-- not just bloggers-- feel that NK is indeed capable of extravagant (even stupid) action.

The meat of Scarlet's post:

I'm tired of everyone that only has a bit knowledge of Korean affairs ASSUMING that Seoul will be their first target for an artillery barrage. aiming your artillery (which is really your only defense against the US) at unarmed civilians while the US air force and army are pounding you will only cause the war to end quickly. i find it hard to believe the norks are that stupid.

This is apparently Scarlet's learned opinion, obviously derived from expert sources and a far deeper knowledge of the military situation than a cranially challenged hominid could possibly possess. Because the hominid is indeed cranially challenged-- and a student of Korean Buddhism, not military history or strategy-- his mission over the past couple hours has been to dredge up his own expert testimony to corroborate his opinion.

Welcome, then, to CDI.org. Here's a cut-and-paste from their website:

CDI was founded in 1972 by recently-retired, senior U.S. military officers. [...] CDI has evolved into one of the foremost organizations in the nation conducting security-related research-- and is unique among major think tanks in its policy of total independence from vested interests.

The Board of Directors and staff include retired military officers, former U.S. government officials, and civilians expert in a wide range of domestic and international security, defense and military arenas.

So we've got a barrelful of experts. Let me step aside and let them tell it like it is.

Here's the URL to a relevant PDF doc:

CDI doc on NK

An excerpt from the doc:

More than 11,000 DPRK artillery weapons are pointed at over 10 million citizens in Seoul. North Korea's 1.2 million-man Army is the world's fourth largest fighting force. Two-thirds of those soldiers are stationed within 60 miles of the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ), along with thousands of tanks and armored personnel carriers.

Please note: POINTED AT SEOUL. Not pointed skyward. True, if we can manage several thousand sorties a day, you're right, Cap-- they're gonna point artillery skyward. In the meantime, though, they plan to hit Seoul. Are we clear?

Further on, the doc says:

Some intelligence analysts [i.e., not bloggers like yours truly] have been predicting that North Korea could make one nuclear weapon per month by late summer, adding to the fear that surplus bomb fuel could be sold to countries like Iran, already a certified North Korean weapons customer.

Cap, what's great about your comment is that it's forcing me to do more research and less speculating. Luckily, I'm discovering my speculation isn't far off. Still annoyed by people who only know a little about the Korean situation? Guess what: looks like you're learning with me.

And I'll say again that NK has the bomb. While the above passage isn't conclusive proof by any means, it strongly supports my school of thought. If you're gonna complain about my armchair speculation, don't pretend you're in the know and then make naive claims of your own. That way leads to the dark side.

I don't want to quote the entire doc, so let's quote this before I move on to other experts:

Apart from shortages of platforms and weapons, tying together the command, control and communications network required to destroy, on the first try, all the North Korean rocket launchers and heavy artillery without heavy damage to Seoul potentially could be very difficult. Orchestrating all the weapons and sensors involved, without mutual interference among weapons being delivered, could pose major difficulties. Previous attempts to tie together remotely sited weapon systems, such as the US Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability, faced drawn out teething problems. The command and control network would have to work the first time to save Seoul from tremendous damage.

Like me, the experts are assuming a huge initial bombardment of Seoul, Cap. This is only common sense.

OK, let's find some other experts, since I know you appreciate expertise.

Here's something from the Rand Corp. that you might like. They actually speculate along YOUR lines that Seoul might not be the ultimate priority. But they waffle a tad. Here're the relevant bits:

Despite North Korea's hugely problematic economic prospects, its principal military objectives appear to have changed very little during the 1990s: (1) maintain the military capabilities needed to achieve strategic and operational surprise in wartime and to sustain strategic momentum so that breakthrough operations can be successfully concluded before the arrival of major US reinforcements; (2) utilize massive firepower against CFC forces through its artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and surface-to-surface missiles; (3) isolate Seoul and capture all air and naval facilities capable of supporting US reinforcement and resupply efforts; (4) neutralize ROK and US air power; and (5) foster widespread internal confusion and panic in the population of the South, thereby creating domestic pressures in the ROK for a settlement on terms advantageous to the DPRK.

Seoul once again, Cap. But Rand waffles here:

For Pyongyang, the key operational imperative if an initial breakthough were nonetheless achieved would be to deter, delay, or otherwise neutralize the effectiveness of US reinforcement. Indeed, in a second Korean conflict, the North may believe that the strategic center of gravity is not the Seoul region, but rather the airports and seaports well below Seoul. Threatened or outright use of WMD capabilities, irrespective of the risks or consequences, might therefore be seen as critical to advancing vital North Korean political and military objectives.

"Irrespective of risks or consequences." Clear? Kim wants to live, but if his back is to the wall, he'll do what he thinks is necessary.

So: could NK act extravagantly to further a single-minded (and ultimately doomed) objective? Even Rand says yes, it could, Cap. Does Seoul still figure, in Rand's estimation? Yes, they list the isolation of Seoul as Objective #3. Seoul will not be ignored. Does Rand grant the possibility of WMD use? Yes, it does.

Let's move on to what the Cato Institute has to say.

Wow. You click the "North Korea" link in the Hot Topics section, and get directed to a list of papers and books and articles for and against different kinds of action on the peninsula. To wit:

Studies:

"Wrong War, Wrong Place, Wrong Time: Why Military Action Should Not Be Used to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Crisis," by Doug Bandow, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing Paper No. 76, May 12, 2003.

"Options for Dealing with North Korea," by Ted Galen Carpenter, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing Paper No. 73, January 6, 2003.

"Korean Détente: A Threat to Washington’s Anachronistic Military Presence," by Doug Bandow, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing Paper No. 59, August 17, 2000.

"Free Rider: South Korea's Dual Dependence on America," by Doug Bandow, Cato Policy Analysis No. 308, May 19, 1998.

"North Korea and the Risks of Coercive Nonproliferation," by Doug Bandow, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing Paper No. 24, May 4, 1993.

"Defusing the Korean Bomb," by Doug Bandow , Cato Foreign Policy Briefing Paper No. 14, December 16, 1991.

"Korea: The Case for Disengagement," by Doug Bandow, Cato Policy Analysis No. 96, December 8, 1987.

Books:

Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, by Doug Bandow (1996).

The U.S.-South Korean Alliance: Time for a Change, edited by Doug Bandow and Ted Galen Carpenter (1991).

Opinion and Commentary:

"Enlisting China: The battle [for] nuclear-free Koreas," by Doug Bandow, A Cato Commentary, NRO, April 29, 2003.

"N. Korea Is No Place to Apply Iraq 'Lessons'," by Doug Bandow, A Cato Commentary, The LA Times, April 22, 2003.

"Forcing Foes Into a Nuclear Corner," by Ted Galen Carpenter, A Cato Commentary, The LA Times, January 8, 2003.

"Pyongyang Preemption: Dealing with North Korea," by Ted Galen Carpenter, A Cato Commentary, National Review Online, January 3, 2003.

"Needless Exposure to Risk," by Ted Galen Carpenter, A Cato Commentary, The Washington Times, December 19, 2002.

"A Nuclear Reaction to North Korea," by Ted Galen Carpenter, A Cato Commentary, The Financial Times, December 12, 2002.

"Confronting the Korean Bomb," by Doug Bandow, A Cato Daily Commentary, October 25, 2002.

"Axis of Evil: Tilting at Windmills," by Charles V. Peña, A Cato Daily Commentary, February 22, 2002.

"Military Readiness and Korean Commitments," by Doug Bandow, A Cato Commentary, Copley News Service, August 31, 2000.

"Leave Korea to the Koreans," by Doug Bandow, A Cato Daily Commentary, May 27, 2000.

"Hugs for Pyongyang," by Doug Bandow, A Cato Commentary, The Washington Times, October 8, 1999.

"Rethinking the North Korean Threat," by Doug Bandow, A Cato Commentary, Newsday, August 27, 1999.

"Missile Defenses and East Asian Security," by Ted Galen Carpenter, A Cato Commentary, The Los Angeles Times, April 7, 1999.

"Korea's Biggest Worry Is Internal," by Jonathan Clarke, A Cato Commentary, The Los Angeles Times, March 13, 1997.

"Cold War Mentality Taints Security Issues in Asia," by Jonathan Clarke, A Cato Commentary, The Los Angeles Times, November 1, 1996.

I'm looking through Doug Bandow's paper-- the first one. He takes the nuke threat seriously, and counsels a cautious multilateralist approach. Nukes in NK, Cap.

Ted Galen Carpenter's paper (second one down) says this:

Indeed, in a worst-case scenario, there is a risk that mushroom clouds could blossom above Seoul and Tokyo-- or above US bases in South Korea or Okinawa.

He takes nukes seriously, too. Starting to get the message? Or are these experts, who aren't plump and daft bloggers like yours truly, all somehow wrong?

A Salon.com article from March of this year, which says in part:

[remember you'll probably need to get a "Premium Day Pass" to view the article, unless you're already a Salon subscriber... I'm not sure whether you can peruse the Salon archives without a pass]

March 7, 2003: Bruce Bennett is a student of the North Korean armed forces and military strategy. When he talks about a possible conflict between the United States and Kim Jong Il's government, the talk turns quickly to scenes of devastation and death.

Perhaps it would begin with a subtle move by North Korea -- an apparent accident, even -- that would draw a military response from the U.S. Perhaps it would start with a U.S. preemptive strike on the Yongbyon nuclear complex where North Korea could process plutonium for nuclear weapons. There are scores of possibilities, says Bennett, a senior analyst for RAND, a military think tank based in Santa Monica, Calif. And in an interview Thursday with Salon, he said any of them could spark an "escalation spiral" -- a sequence of attacks and counterattacks that were more and more deadly.

The North Koreans could lob missiles laden with deadly chemical agents at big U.S. bases in South Korea. They could send special forces to target the U.S. bases for surreptitious biological weapons attacks. The U.S. could level North Korean nuclear facilities, spreading radioactive debris through the area. The North Koreans could rain 500,000 shells an hour on the South.

"It could get ugly and escalate to nuclear weapon use," Bennett warns. Even without that disastrous turn, he says, over a million people might be left dead.

This, in fact, was my original source for the 500,000 shells per hour stat, as well as the million-casualty stat.

Of further note, the RAND expert says:

North Korea has a lot of long-range artillery. Typical long-range artillery systems have batteries with six launchers, which could carry in the neighborhood of a ton or so of chemical weapons into Seoul. That ton would cover a square kilometer. If they put it in some of the more highly populated areas, you could be talking about casualties in the tens of thousands per six-launcher battery. And potentially if they chose to use them, they've got hundreds of launchers.

The RAND expert spoke to Salon in the context of an interview. Here's a quick exchange:

SALON: I often read references to 1 million casualties if there ever was a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula. Is that the scenario you were talking about earlier, with a North Korean invasion into the South and a protracted conflict on the peninsula?

BENNETT: Yes, the people who have talked about that kind of number have talked about it usually in the context of conventional weaponry. When you cross the boundary into weapons of mass destruction, the numbers could certainly be higher. But this is an invasion kind of scenario. You've got all the North Korean artillery firing. The former U.S. commander in Korea talked about North Korea being able to fire 500,000 artillery rounds per hour into the South, which they could sustain for hours. We're talking about a huge amount of devastation caused by that kind of military force.

That's the RAND expert, not me.

From the Arms Control Association:

Sheer numbers and warning time compound the problem of taking out North Korea’s WMD. For delivery vehicles, it has an estimated 12,000 artillery tubes and 2,300 multiple rocket launchers that, from their current emplacements, are capable of raining 500,000 shells per hour on U.S. and South Korean troops. Five hundred long-range artillery pieces are able to target Seoul, which is only about 20 miles from the demilitarized zone that separates North and South Korea.

By one estimate, much of North Korea’s forward-based force is protected by over 4,000 underground facilities in the forward area alone, including tunnels under the demilitarized zone that would enable the North Koreans to rapidly insert forces behind the defenders. Warning times for U.S. and South Korean forces would be short—24 hours or less—if North Korea invaded using this forward-leaning posture.

Coming back to my three-pointed reply to Scarlet, then, I restate with confidence:

1. Experts-- not just bloggers-- know that thousands of artillery units are in fact pointed at Seoul, not the sky. This indicates, at the least, the intent to blast Seoul. Artillery POINTED AT SEOUL, not "facing vaguely toward."

2. Experts-- not just bloggers-- take the nuclear threat seriously and do not feel safe assuming that NK has no nukes yet.

3. Experts-- not just bloggers-- feel that NK is indeed capable of extravagant (even stupid) action.

Once again, I acknowledge that I, personally, am no expert. But Cap, save your fucking annoyance for someone who can't actually reply intelligently to it. In the meantime, thanks: I'm a bit smarter now, because you made me get off my ass and do some work.
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