NK starvation: what the think tanks say (Volume 1)

I write "Volume 1" above because funds are limited, which means my time in the PC-bahng is also limited. So expect more on this soon.

A quick recap of the questions I'm working on re: the starvation issue and how it relates to the NK military:

1. What are the latest figures/expert guesses on NK starvation, in terms of rate and brute numbers? What's the general history of the starvation problem, and what projections, if any, are there about future starvation?

2. Who's currently giving food aid to NK? What percentage of NK's food supply is being domestically produced?

3. Can an overall picture of NK food production, delivery, and consumption be painted? How accurate will this picture be?

4. What measures, if any, are in place to verify where food goes (this question is crucial; if we can't answer it satisfactorily, we can't answer the "are the troops starving?" question satisfactorily, either)? Are military defectors from NK in a position to speak about diverted food?

5. If we get past question #4 and have at least some idea where food is going, how much is being routed to the military? How are the lower-echelon people in NK's government doing?

You may recall a previous post in which I explored this question primarily through the source material I found at the Free North Korea! site (a site I highly recommend). Can we, at this point, answer some of the above questions? Let's give it a shot, based on what little we now know or think we know.

1. What are the latest figures/expert guesses on NK starvation, in terms of rate and brute numbers? What's the general history of the starvation problem, and what projections, if any, are there about future starvation?

No answers yet from my own research. Maybe some tonight and in evenings to come.

2. Who's currently giving food aid to NK? What percentage of NK's food supply is being domestically produced?

Based on what we've found out, it sounds like 4.6 million out of NK's 22 million people are depending on outside food aid, which is ostensibly being directed to those regions that need it most. As a percentage, then, about 21% of the population has been receiving food aid. We think.

3. Can an overall picture of NK food production, delivery, and consumption be painted? How accurate will this picture be?

I phrased this as a yes-no question, so my answer at this point is no. I don't believe an overall picture can be painted based on what I discovered through my limited research. I think a more detailed picture might be available to us through think tank research, and perhaps through whatever UN-related online sources there are. How accurate a picture do I think this will be? Not very accurate-- partly because I'm only an amateur, only a blogger; partly because NK is deliberately obscuring the specifics; partly because wire service reports and defector testimonies are patchy and anecdotal. I don't have much confidence that the think tanks will ultimately provide us a very clear picture, especially as their findings are compared against each other.

4. What measures, if any, are in place to verify where food goes (this question is crucial; if we can't answer it satisfactorily, we can't answer the "are the troops starving?" question satisfactorily, either)? Are military defectors from NK in a position to speak about diverted food?

What measures are in place? At this point, I'd have to say I don't know. With most of the reports emphasizing deep frustration with the food aid workers' inability to verify where the food goes, it may be wise to ask whether there even are any measures. Perhaps the UN and NGOs do have some verification methods established on paper; whether they occur in practice is almost a completely separate issue.

As to the military defectors... I may delve back into Free North Korea! and root around the defectors' testimony there.

5. If we get past question #4 and have at least some idea where food is going, how much is being routed to the military? How are the lower-echelon people in NK's government doing?

I have no answers to this question right now.

So: think tanks.

THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

James R. Lilley's March 12, 2003 Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony deserves to be quoted at length:

Kim Jong-il has a failed economic system. He is on life support from the outside in terms of oil and food. Ungrateful as North Korea has been for past aid, this time it is complicated by a starving population, even including cadres. Kim's moves so far on economic reform in July 2002 have failed badly, his attempt to get the Japanese reparations package, for which he lusts, backfired in the Abduction Cases issue. His economic zone in Sinuiju started out as a fiasco and certainly irritated the Chinese. Kim still has the generous hand of South Korea reaching out-- but now hopefully in a more measured and balanced way. Huge bribes and grotesque one-sided tourism deals to Kum Gang-san lost large amounts of money for Hyundai, and the ROKG. Hyundai is reported to have funneled $1.7 billion direct to Pyongyang. South Korea's Sunshine Policy is viewed by the North's leadership as a dangerous subversion, according to the highest level defector Hwang Jong yup, who is the most complete source on Kim Jong-il. A takeover of the North by the South, Kim Jong-il believes, should be resisted at all costs, even if it means less aid.

Perhaps the most disconcerting development for Kim Jong-il is the possible coming together of surrounding states-- ROK, China, Japan, Russia, and the U.S.-- in a loose coalition. This group of states has already agreed in principle that the Korean Peninsula should be free of nuclear weapons and should have economic reform. The potential use of economic leverage on his WMD programs is a frightening prospect for Kim and is one of the greatest dangers that North Korea has faced in the past 50 years.

According to Hwang Jong Yup, after the disastrous starvations of 1995 and 1996, Kim Jong-il was desperate and talked of strike on the South, which he had persuaded himself could work. He did not do it then. He fired off a three stage missile instead which then lost him his Japanese contacts and hopes for immediate reparations worth by some estimates to be over $10 billion.

A recent internal KWP document that has surfaced in the Japanese press describing KWP concerns about internal corruption and dissatisfaction among the population. The flight of hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees to China has dramatized public desperation in the face of continuing economic hardships. The combination of factors could move Kim in the direction of more desperate external moves and to divert attention from domestic failure. In this, he will get the support of his military.

As was the case in 1968, Kim Jong-il lacks support from Russia and China-- who had backed his father in 1950 and for years after. This undercuts his strength and his maneuverability.

So will he raise the ante with provocations? Most probably, he will. Will he focus on the U.S. and not on the ROK? Most likely, he will. Will he risk a major confrontation with the U.S. by striking out at U.S. installations, military, air, ground and naval hardware? He will try but will probably stop short of a casus belli. He recognizes his main vulnerability is his economic weakness and dependency. Again, Hwang emphasizes that this is where Kim Jong-il can be undone. He has to keep economic aid under continuing tight control, and he must arrange to get credit for it. But it remains his Achilles heel. And it is the most likely instrument of regime change.

[to be continued... I'm out of time this evening.]
_