If a property is defined as an instantiable entity, then existence cannot be understood as a property of existing particulars. This is because the particular must already exist to be in a position to instantiate any properties including the putative property of existence.
This is a great explanation of the claim "existence is not a predicate." In John Hick's Philosophy of Religion, it's explained this way (I'm citing this from memory, so this isn't an exact quote): if we say "a cow exists," we're not saying "a cow has existence," as if existence were a predicate (property): what we're really saying is "there's an X such that 'X is a cow' is true." Hick's explanation dovetails perfectly with what Dr. V wrote above.
In slightly simpler language: in order for some X to have (possess) something, X already has to exist. It therefore makes no sense to say "X has existence" because you're trapping yourself in an infinite loop (or "vicious circle"): X has to exist before it can be said to have existence. The very property X is supposed to have must be in place before X can be said to have it.
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